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Some Characteristics of the Statistical System
every Soviet work on statistics asserts the superiority of the
Soviet statistical system over its "capitalist" counterparts. It is said
that under capitalism comprehensive and truthful economic statistics
are not to be expected because of the secretiveness of private firms,
the lack of centralized coordination in and authority over the gener-
ation and collection of data, the class interests of the governments
in power and the mendacity of their statisticians, etc. Soviet statistics,
it is claimed on the other hand, have the decisive advantages of cor-
rect ideological and scientific foundations, administrative centraliza-
tion and methodological unity, completeness of coverage, rapid re-
porting, the intellectual and scientific integrity of statisticians un-
corrupted by special interests, and so forth.'
The relative merits of the two "types" of statistical system do not
concern us at the moment. (Besides, for many purposes the more
meaningful contrast is between statistics in a command economy
and those in a market economy, rather than between "socialist" and
"capitalist" statistics.) Instead, let us ask what are the specffic fea-
tures of the Soviet statistical system that are pertinent to the prob-
lem at hand, the collection and compilation of physical output data.
Ideological Foundations
Soviet statistics—using the term now in the sense of an intellectual
discipline—has been rather turbulently affected throughout its his-
tory by ideological and philosophical cross currents, although its
required allegiance to "Marxism-Leninism" has never been formally
open to question, of course. The full story remains to be told in the
West. A spirited discussion on the nature of statistics filled the jour-
nals between 1949 and the formulation of an official position in 1954.
The developments since 1949 have been analyzed in an interesting
article by Schattman, who sees an attempt to subordinate statistics
1Cf.L. M. Tsyrlin and A. I. Petrov, Burzhuaznaia .statistika skryvaet pravdu
[Bourgeois Statistics Conceal the Truth], Moscow, 1953, pas.s'im; D. B. Savin-
skii, Kurs prom yshlennoi statistiki [A Course in Industrial Statistics], Moscow,
1954, pp. 24-28; and S.K. Tatur, Organizatsiia narodnokhoziai$tvennogo
ucheta v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve [The Organization of Economic Rec-
ord-Keeping in a Socialist Society], Moscow, 1955,P. 10.
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(as a science) to the ideological and propaganda needs of the re-
girne, but finds a distinct relaxation since 1954 in this regard.2
The latest doctrinal position is summarized in the following ex-
cerpt from an article in the Encyclopedic Dictionary published in
"Statistics is a distinct [samostoiatel'naia] 'social science which
studies the quantitative aspects of mass social phenomena insepara-
bly from their qualitative aspects. ...Thetheoretical bases of statis-
tics are historical materialism and Marxist-Leninist political economy.
•..Withdue regard for the nature and basic characteristics of the
object of its study, statistics develops 'special techniques and methods
of research (mass observation, frequency distributions, descriptive
measures) which in their totality comprise statistical methodology.
In some instances statistics may employ the methods of mathematical
statistics, including the probability theory. ...Statisticsis a class
and party-oriented science. Its main purpose is •the
processing, analysis, and timely submission to the agencies of state
planning and administration of accurate and scientifically founded
statistical data that show the course of fulfillment of state plans, the
growth of socialist economy and culture, the supply of material re-
sources in the economy and their utilization, the development of
the various branches of the economy relative to each other, and the
potentialities for the overfulfiliment of the plan."°
That this definition is "loaded" politically and ideologically is clear.
But it does not necessarily follow that the collection and compilation
of physical output statistics—as distinct from their publication and
propaganda use—are affected by the "slant." The tendencies toward
distortion of physical output data that may be inherent in the sta-
2S.E. Schattman, "Dogma vs. Science in Soviet Statistics," Problems of
Communism, January-February 1956, pp. 30-35. For an analysis of the dis-
cussion in its earlier stages, see Stuart A. Rice ("Statistical Conceptions in the
Soviet Union," The Review of Economics and StatLstics, February 1952, pp. 82-
86, and "Statistics in the Soviet Union," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June
1952, pp. 159-162), who also interpreted the developments as an encroach-
ment of ideology and politics on the science of statistics. For an English trans-
lation of one of the recent authoritative statements, and a brief comment
thereon by C. E. V. Leser, see Soviet Studies, January 1955,pp. 321-331.
3Entsiklopedicheskiislovar' (Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, 1955, Vol.
in,p.320. Interestingly, the passage between the asterisks (inserted by me)
is identical with a passage describing the task of the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration in the same volume (p. 577). That is to say, statistics as a science
is what the Central Statistical Administration does.
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tistical system seem to be explainable without necessarily resorting
to ideological factors in the strict sense.
Purposes of Soviet Statistics
Whileto some extent economic statistics may be collected and com-
piled in the Soviet Union for the "general use" of the leaders of the
regime, or for employment in propaganda at home and abroad, or
for the preservation and extension of bureaucratic "empires" within
the statistical apparatus and other departments, they are primarily
collected and compiled for a number of purposes related to the plan-
ning and administration of the economy. These purposes are:
1. Guidance of managerial decisions (operativno-tekhnicheskoe
rukovodstvo) in the enterprise and at higher levels.
2.Checking on the course and extent of plan fulfillment.
3. Aid in future planning.
4. Aid in the allocation of equipment, materials, manpower, and
other resources.
5.Dispensation of individual and group rewards and penalties.
6.Checking on compliance with various laws and regulations
(e.g. inventory control, wage and price control, etc.).
It must be noted that, by and large, the same flow of statistical data
serves several of these objectives at once; that some of the purposes
are intimately connected with the fortunes of individuals and groups;
and that frequently the interested individuals participate in the gen-
eration and reporting of the very statistical data on which their per-
formance is judged. This is particularly true of statistics of output.
But the same flow of data culminates in regional and national sets
of compiled statistics, from which the data released to the world at
large are presumably drawn. Thus, in a sense, the regional and na-
tional statistics of output are largely declared by parties who have
a vested interest in them. Although its effect is limited by fear of
the strict penalties imposed for false reporting, as well as by various
institutional checks discussed below, this fact is perhaps the greatest
defect in the Soviet statistical system, and perhaps the strongest
reason to suspect the reliability of the published physical output data.
Statistics and Planning4
As we have seen, a major purpose of Soviet statistics is to report on
the progress of plan fulfillment and the availability of resources, and
The following Soviet sources, among others, refer directly (if not fully) to
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to facilitate future planning. The other purposes—such as guidance
of day-to-day operations or the dispensation of rewards and punish-
ments to management—are also closely related to the execution of
economic plans. Given the nature and scope of Soviet planning, sta-
tistics clearly should be not only accurate and timely, but at least as
detailed as the plans themselves. (In fact, they are much more de-
tailed than the plans.) Further, there should be methodological
uniformity and consistency not only within the body of statistical
data, but also between it and the corpus of planning categories and
concepts. Operational statistics are the language of Soviet-type plan-
ning. "Without statistics there can be no
This would seem to argue for the closest organizational contact
between statistical and planning authorities, if not for their complete
integration. However, the picture is not as simple as that, for the
statistical apparatus is an agency of supervision (kontrol'), in addi-
tion to being a source of information for planners—supervision not
only of the activity of producers (enterprises, departments, etc.) but
also of the efficiency of the planners—and, one should add, the eco-
nomic commanders—themselves. Beyond this lies the danger that
statisticians will dominate planning by virtue of their hold on inf or-
mation. Thus, a certain amount of organizational independence
between statistics and planning is also desirable.
Here is how Devons, a percipient observer of planning, albeit
under conditions of a relatively "mild" command economy in Britain
during the last war, sees the dilemma:6
"Attempts were made to avoid this danger [of statisticians guiding
policy by selecting or manipulating statistics—G.G.], by separating
the collection and issue of statistics from decisions and discussions
of policy. But such attempts invariably failed [in the Ministry of
the relation between statistics and planning: Bol'shaia sooetskaia entsiklopediia
[The Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 1st ed., Vol. 56, pp. 477ff.; B. I. Braginskii
and N.S.Koval', Organizatsiia planirovaniia narodnogo SSSR
[Organization of Economic Planning in the USSR], Moscow, 1954, p. 126; A. I.
Petrov (ed.), Kurs ekonomicheskoi statistiki [A Course in Economic Statistics],
2nd ed., Moscow, 1954, p.6;A.I.Gozulov, Ekonomicheskaia statLstika
[Economic Statistics], Moscow, 1953, pp. 26-29; S. A. Shchenkov, Otchetnost'
promyshlennykh predpriiatii [Reporting by Industrial Enterprises], Moscow,
1952, p.8; and L. M. Volodarskii,Statis'tika prom yshlennostii voprosy
planirovaniia [Statistics of Industry and Planning], Moscow, 1958, passim.
5 Devons,Planning in Practice: Essays in Aircraft Planning in Wartime,
CambrIdge, 1950, p. 133.
8Ibid.,pp. 183ff.
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Aircraft Production]. First, because the analysis of data about the
past is so intimately concerned with the planning of the future, that
any attempt to separate the two functions usually resulted either in
the planners paying little attention to the past and so making the
most unrealistic plans, or in the planners setting up their own fact-
finding staff which by-passed the statistical division and so deprived
it of any influence. Secondly, life in a statistics division which was
separated from policy was apt to be dull, and there was great dif-
ficulty in attracting efficient staff to such a division. In any case,
unless the staff of the statistics division were closely concerned with
the policy decisions, they had no easy means of knowing which were
the most signifiéant statistics to collect and analyse; and they had
the greatest difficulty in ensuring that some notice was taken of the
results of their analyses. The danger that planners who have a mo-
nopoly of the statistics might distort the figures to prove their case
cannot be avoided. Where planning is necessary, great power must
inevitably fall into the hands of the statistician."
While these observations do not entirely apply to the Soviet scene
(where, for one thing, the structure of information-gathering, plan-
ning, and command-issuing authorities and agencies is a much more
complex one than in Devons' experience), the basic dilemma is
fundamentally the same.
The history of the Soviet statistical apparatus, as sketched in the
preceding chapter, fully reflects this dilemma. As we have seen,
during the twenties the planning and statistical authorities were
separate organizations. To improve methodological coordination be-
tween the Gasplan and TsSU, the latter was dissolved early in 1930,
and its functions were completely absorbed by the former, so that the
statistical agencies virtually lost all independent identity. This was
the high-water mark of integration. Less than two years later,
TsUNKhIJ was established as an autonomous administration within
the framework of the Gosplan, andthe newly created local statistical
agencies were likewise affiliated with their respective local planning
commissions. As planning became more comprehensive and detailed,
complaints of the inadequacy and lack of methodological agreement
with planning were directed to the statistical apparatus, culminating
in a more complete absorption of TsUNKhU by the Gosplan. And
finally, in August 1948, the statistical administration, now renamed
TsSU again, was completely separated from its parent body under
circumstances that at least suggest the desire, for internal political
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reasons, to employ the fact-gathering apparatus as a counterpoise
to the planning At present, the local statistical agencies
are administratively entirely subordinated to TsSU.
As already mentioned, inadequate conceptual coordination be-
tween statistics and planning received much attention in the thirties.8
The problem came to the forefront during the work on the Second
Five-Year Plan and the annual plan for 1934. In the course of com-
piling the 1935 plan, an interdepartmental committee (consisting of
representatives of the Gosplan, TsUNKhU, heavy industry, and the
Commission of Soviet Control) on methodological unity between
planning and statistics was The concrete results of this
attempt are not known, but in 1937 (during work on the next five-
year plan) and in 1938 the literature registers new complaints on the
same subject, this time coupled with accusations of intentional
"wrecking."°
Methodological Unity
The launching of comprehensive and detailed national economic
planning brought up the necessity for thorough consistency and
comparability of statistical data,i.e.for a "uniform system of
record-keeping" (edinai.a sistemaucheta)for the entire economy.
Considerable efforts were made, especially in the early thirties, to
realize this goal.1' It involved essentially working out (1) standard
definitions, (2) mutually consistent definitions for such different
items as might be brought together in the course of economic analy-
sis and planning, and (3) uniform and standardized methods of
collecting, reporting, and classifying data.
To this end, the power to prescribe, supervise, and direct statisti-
cal work throughout the whole economy has been centralized in
TsSU (and its predecessors)which has been carrying out this
See pp. 18ff.
8Alist of complaints may be found in A. Sperlina, "Uviazat' pokazatei
ucheta s pokazateliami plana" [Coordinate Statistical Indicators with Planning
Indicators], Plan, 1934, No. 5, pp. 41-43.
Plan, 1934, No. 4, p. 65.
10 Plan,1937,No. 10, p. 61; P.Kh., 1938, No. 3, p. 13; ibid., 1938, No. 7,
p. 7.
11 See, for example, the order of the Supreme Council of the Economy
(VSNKh), dated July 24, 1931 (B.F.Kh.Z., 1931, No. 26, pp. 20ff.).
12 The earliest serious step in this direction was apparently the Resolution
of the Council of Ministers of May9, 1931 (see p. 15) which charged the
Gos plan, and specifically its Sector of Economic Record-Keeping, with this
function.
See B.F.Kh.Z., 1931, No. 15, p. 70; it will be recalled that this was shortly
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function primarily by standardizing the statistical reporting forms's
throughout the economy, providing detailed instructions for them,
requiring complete adherence to these forms and instructions, and
prohibiting the solicitation of unapproved—so-called "wild"—re-
ports. The enforcement of this last injunction has been a major
perennial problem for the statistical authorities, as there seems to
be a strong propensity on the part of the Soviet (or any other)
bureaucracy to bypass established reporting channels and to assert
its authority over subordinates by demanding endless periodic and
ad hoc reports. The subordinates, on their part, apparently find it
either impossible to resist these demands or convenient to accede
to them as part of a live-and-let-live arrangement.
Despite the early efforts to impose methodological unity, com-
plaints on this score continued well into the thirties and have been
cropping up even in more recent years. For instance, as late as 1938
there were two sets of data on the number of workers in large-scale
industry, compiled by the industry sector and the labor sector of
TsUNKhU, respectively.14 On the same date there was still lack of
uniformity in the reporting of tractor work, wages, construction,
and so forth.15 The blame for this situation was laid on "wreckers"
and, more justifiably, on the organization of reporting along func-
tional lines (ftsnktsionalka), which bad led to the drawing up of
definitions, forms, and instructions independently by the various
sectors of TsUNKhU.'° As we have already seen, these charges
contributed to the reorganization of TsUNKhU later that year.
Since 1938 such complaints have been much less frequent in the
literature. To what extent this is due to less cause for complaint,
and to what extent to mounting secrecy, cannot be determined, but
time may have brought some improvement in this regard, in any
case. There can be little doubt, everything considered, that by now
the Soviet system of industrial reporting, as of economic statistics
in general, not only is extraordinarily comprehensive, but also
possesses a high degree of internal methodological unity.
before the organization of TsUNKhU in December of that year, but after the
dissolution of the old TsS U.
Forms for the annual report and for all accounting reports are prescribed
jointly by TsSU and the Ministry of Finance.
14 P.Kh., 1938, No. 3, pp. 173-175. Ibid., pp. 13-15.
16 On methodological discrepancies in the reporting by heavy industry due
to "functionalism" in TsUNKhU, see also M. Tsaguriia, "Voprosy ucheta v
sviazi s planom raboty TsUNKhU" [Problems of Record-Keeping in Connection
with the Plan of Work of TsUNKhU], Plan, 1935, No. 12, p. 32.
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Directness, Speed, and Volume of Reporting
All statistical systems, of course, aim at completeness of coverage,
directness of observation, and timeliness of reporting, insofar as
their needs so require and their budgets so allow. But the existence
of a command economy in the Soviet case, which shapes the relation
of statistics to planning and economic administration, makes these
desiderata particularly imperative, while at the same time the
authoritarian nature of the regime can demand compliance with
a voluminous and highly exacting set of reporting requirements.
Soviet statistics of physical output of industry are thus eventually
based on complete or near-complete coverage of all producing
enterprises, with all but the smallest of them reporting continuously
and under highly standardized conditions. The smallest enterprises
are accounted for in periodic censuses. The reporting is always
direct, i.e. in units of the product itself, rather than in such indirect
measures of output as man-hours worked or materials consumed
(which may be reported too, however )—a characteristic which is
usually listed among the alleged superiorities of Soviet over "capi-
talist" statistics. Insofar as some "capitalist" output statistics are
based on indirect data, this is so—at least, if the direct information
is reliable, and if data-gathering costs are disregarded. The last,
in turn, must be seen in the light of differential needs for full,
prompt, and exact output information in command and in market
economies.
This brings us to the next two features that strike the outside
observer: the extremely early due dates for the regular reports, and
the enormous volume of reporting in general to which Soviet enter-
prises and other entities are subject. For instance, comprehensive
monthly and quarterly reports must be submitted within 15 days
of the end of the reporting period, and the definitive annual report
is due by January 25.17 Output data as such, however, must be
reported even faster—within a few days (see Chapter 3)—and are
apparently processed, or at least consolidated, equally fast. Witness
the fact that since the war TsSU has usually published annual,
semiannual, and quarterly plan fulfillment reports between the 20th
and the 31st day following the end of the period. The annual report
17V.I. Pereslegin, Novoe polozhenie o bukhgalterskikh otchetakh i balar&-
sakh [The New Statute on Accounting Reports and Statementsj, Moscow,
1952, p. 10. See also Chapter 3, the section on continuous reporting of indus-
trial output.
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for 1958 was published in the Soviet press as early as January 16,
1959, and the report for the first half of 1959 as early as July
14, 1959.
There is great pressure on the part of the statistical authorities to
ensure the prompt reporting by enterprises and their economic-
administrative superiors.. The pressure undoubtedly originates with
the highest political authorities and the planning agencies, both
ever hungry for factual data on which to base policy decisions or
routine planning. It is probably reinforced by the fact that, from
the standpoint of the statistical authorities, promptness of report
submission is a convenient criterion—much more so than the accu-
racy of the submitted information—by which to appraise the "effi-
ciency" of the reporting system.'8 Nonetheless, tardiness of report
submission by enterprises seems to be common.19 How TsSU still
manages to publish the periodic plan fulfillment announcements
within three or four (or even two) weeks of the close of the period
in question remains unclear; presumably a certain amount of esti-
mation of missing data is resorted to on such occasions.
I shall not dwell here on the inordinate volume of reporting,2°
except to note that it entails an enormous amount of recording,
bookkeeping, computing, and other paper work.21 The sheer volume
of the work, coupled with the speed that is demanded of much of
it, cannot but dilute the quality of the statistics by both inviting
error and providing opportunities for distortion to the more skillful
practitioners of the art.22
18 Cf. Robert W. Campbell, "Accounting for Cost Control in the Soviet
Economy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1958, P. 61.
19 R. W. Campbell, "The Mechanization of Accounting in the Soviet Union,"
The American Slavic and East European Review, February 1958, pp. 73-74.
20 See C. Grossman, "In the Land of Paper Pyramids," of Corn-
munisin, July-August 1955, for a discussion of this problem and of recent efforts
to alleviate it. The problem is an old one; it has been the subject of bitter
complaints in the press at least since the beginning of the Plan Era.
2]. It was said in 1953 that 2.3 million persons were engaged in doing work
of this sort in the Soviet economy (P.Kh., 1953, No. 4, p. 94). More recently
the number was placed at "about three million, almost 80 per cent of whom
are engaged in so-called primary record-keeping" (Pravda, May 12, 1958). In
1957, over 10,000 separate industrial commodities were subject to regular
centralizedproduction reporting(A.N. Efimov,Perestroika upravleniia
prom yshlennost'iu i stroitel'stvom v SSSR [Reorganization of Administration
of Industry and Construction in the USSR], Moscow, 1957, p. 90).
22 The journal of accounting editorially rebuked those chief accountants,
"who are still to be found," who hold that "the timely submission of reports
is incompatible with their high quality" (B.U., 1954, No. 10, p. 3). Cf.
Campbell in The Review of Economics and Statistics, p. 61.
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